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Abstract: It is often claimed that pre-attentive vision has an ‘iconic’ format. This is seen to explain 
pre-attentive vision’s characteristically high processing capacity and to make sense of an overlap 
in the mechanisms of early vision and mental imagery. But what does the iconicity of pre-attentive 
vision amount to? This paper considers two prominent ways of characterising pre-attentive visual 
icons and argues that neither is adequate: one approach renders the claim ‘pre-attentive vision is 
iconic’ empirically false while the other obscures its ability to do the explanatory work which 
motivates positing pre-attentive visual icons in the first place. With this noted, I introduce the 
(heretofore unarticulated) notion of an ‘Analog Map’ and argue that it provides a superior 
characterisation of pre-attentive vision’s iconicity. I then argue that this forces a reassessment of 
debates which have traditionally presupposed the iconicity of pre-attentive vision, emphasising 
ramifications for the viability of a format-based perception-thought border. 
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Philosophers and cognitive scientists have long debated the format of mental representations. For 
instance, they have long debated the existence of a language of thought (Fodor, 1975), the use of 
mental models in reasoning tasks (Johnson-Laird, 1980), the conjecture that mental images ‘depict’ 
(Kosslyn, 1980), and the involvement of analogue structures in numerical cognition (Dehaene, 1997). 
In each case, these debates have concerned the formal properties that mental representations possess 
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– the question of how mental representations are structured to make content “explicit” and 
“accessible” (Marr, 1982, pp.20-22). 
Such concerns have not come from nowhere. Mainstream approaches to cognitive science conceive 
of the mind as a computational system, whose inferential transitions proceed (partially, perhaps 
entirely) in virtue of the formal properties mental representations possess (von Neumann, 1953/2013). 
Consequently, apprehending the format of mental representations has been expected to explain 
otherwise puzzling patterns of performance in human psychology (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1989; cf. 
Aizawa, 1997; Kosslyn et al., 2006; cf. Anderson, 1978) and to help demarcate psychological kinds 
that could otherwise be obscured by an advancing cognitive science (Quilty-Dunn, 2019a; cf. Gross 
& Flombaum, 2017).  
In what follows, I’ll consider the format of our pre-attentive visual representations. Admittedly, ‘pre-
attentive vision’ is a provocative label. It’s provocative because some deny that any stage of visual 
processing proceeds independently of attention (Mack & Rock, 1998). Regardless, the label is routinely 
used to reference a stage of early visual processing which is marked by its characteristically high-
processing capacity; processing information in parallel across large portions of the visual field, without 
requiring focussed attention to the items and features it encodes (Wolfe, 2018). Thus construed, ‘pre-
attentive vision’ denotes a significant psychological kind irrespective of its status as fully pre-attentive 
(Palmer, 1999). And since the format of our pre-attentive visual representations features heavily in 
debates about non-conceptual content (Fodor, 2007), phenomenal consciousness (Block, 2011), and 
the architecture of the mind (Dretske, 1981), an obvious objective in the philosophy of psychology is 
to apprehend these representations’ formal structure.   
For this reason, it’s striking that existing discussions appear to reflect broad consensus on this matter. 
Debates rumble on regarding the format of many mental representations. But when theorists examine 
the formal properties of pre-attentive visual representations, they typically converge on the conjecture 
that these have an iconic (roughly: picture-like) format. For many, this explains pre-attentive vision’s 
characteristically high-processing capacity (Dretske, 1981; Fodor, 2007, 2008; Neisser, 1967; Quilty-
Dunn, 2019a), and is implied by both retinotopically arranged maps in early visual cortex (Zeki, 1993) 
and an overlap in the mechanisms of early vision and imagery (Block, 1983a; Quilty-Dunn, 2019b). 
Even Pylyshyn – perhaps the leading critic of picture-like representations elsewhere in cognition – 
concedes that certain pre-attentive visual representations are iconic, and states that this much is 
“generally accepted” (2003, p.29). 
Despite this broad consensus, I believe we lack an adequate characterisation of pre-attentive vision’s 
(alleged) iconicity. The trouble is not that characterisations of ‘iconic representation’ have not been 
provided. It’s that these prove inadequate in this context – on inspection, they render the claim ‘pre-
attentive vision is iconic’ empirically false or they obscure its ability to do the explanatory work which 
motivates positing pre-attentive visual icons in the first place (§2). As such, I’ll seek to provide an 
improved characterisation which avoids these failings. On my account, pre-attentive visual 
representations are iconic (or picture-like) by having a distinctive kind of cartographic structure (§3). 
While related suggestions have been made (Burge, 2018; Treisman, 1988) these remain 
underdeveloped. To advance matters, I’ll introduce the (heretofore unarticulated) notion of an ‘Analog 
Penultimate version of a paper forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly 
Where possible, cite published version 
 3 
Map’, note that it reflects a point of departure from existing characterisations of pre-attentive visual 
representation (§3.1), and argue that it provides a superior characterisation of these, avoiding the 
shortcomings which afflict rival accounts (§3.2). I’ll then suggest that this forces a reassessment of 
debates which routinely presuppose icons in pre-attentive vision. To illustrate, I’ll emphasise 
ramifications for ongoing debates over the viability of a format-based perception-thought border (§4).  
2. Two Accounts of Pre-Attentive Iconicity  
To begin, let’s examine two prominent ways of characterising ‘iconic representation’. For brevity, I’ll 
label these ‘Pictorialism’ and ‘Analogism’ respectively. Both have been seen to capture the sense in 
which pre-attentive visual representations are ‘iconic’ or ‘picture-like’. I’ll argue that neither is entirely 
adequate in this regard. In so doing, I’ll demonstrate the need for an improved account, and highlight 
desiderata on an adequate characterisation.  
2.1 Pictorialism 
Pictorialism is perhaps the most prominent approach to characterising ‘iconic representation’ and pre-
attentive vision in the philosophical literature. Die-hard proponents include Fodor (2007) and Quilty-
Dunn (2016; 2019a; 2019b). But many slip into a kind of Pictorialism when describing pre-attentive 
vision and related representations (e.g., Burge, 2014, p.493 [cf. Burge, 2018]; Carey, 2009, p.135; 
Dretske, 1981, pp.137-8; Kosslyn et al., 2006, p.13). 
For the Pictorialist, iconic mental representations function like realistic pictures. Of course, the 
question of how realistic pictures function is, itself, vexed. But for the Pictorialist, this involves iconic 
mental representations conforming to a strong reading of the Parts Principle (PP) and Holism 
Principle (HP) at a psychological level of analysis.  
 
Figure 1. An origami cat 
Minimally, PP concerns the suggestion that if R is an icon representing X, then:  
parts of R function to represent parts of X with structural relations between parts of R 
representing structural relations between parts of X. 
Thus, when we consider Figure 1 (a paradigmatic icon) we’re invited to note that (spatial) parts of the 
vehicle represent (spatial) parts of the depicted cat (e.g., the cat’s nose, front left leg, and so forth). 
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Furthermore, structural (spatial) relations between vehicle parts mirror structural (spatial) relations 
between cat parts depicted. For those emphasising PP in their characterisation of an icon, this is true 
of icons generally – photographs offer but a convenient illustration.  
Notably, Pictorialists go beyond this minimal reading of PP. They hold that interpretable parts of the 
representation must not only represent parts of that represented by the icon as a whole; they must 
picture these. As Fodor puts it: if P is an icon representing X “then parts of P are pictures of parts of X” 
(2007, p.108). If nothing else, this involves semantically interpretable parts of P representing spatial 
parts of X by themselves conforming to some version of PP (this holds until some point at which the 
parts in question constitute representational “primitives” which no longer comprise semantically 
relevant parts – Fodor, 2008, p.173; Quilty-Dunn, 2019b, fn.8).  
While controversial (Burge, 2018), it’s at least intuitive to think this stronger reading of PP would further 
liken mental icons to realistic pictures. For, returning to the photograph in Figure 1, and the fact that 
it depicts an origami cat by having vehicle parts represent cat parts, it seems these vehicle parts 
represent the cat parts in question by picturing them. This involves them comprising vehicle parts 
which, themselves, represent the cat parts’ parts (e.g., nose parts, leg parts, and so forth), and through 
the spatial arrangement of these vehicle part parts mirroring the spatial arrangement of the depicted 
cat part parts in question. So, if we cut out these vehicle parts, they would depict cat parts by picturing 
them, in a PP conforming manner, as opposed to (say) describing them with linguistic labels. 
To see why this matters, consider the Pictorialist’s second mark of iconicity: HP. HP concerns the 
suggestion that semantically interpretable parts of an icon (implicated in PP) “encode various 
properties at once” (Quilty-Dunn, 2019b, p.4). Thus, when we consider the part of Figure 1 that 
depicts the cat’s tail as triangular, we’re invited to note that it (naturally, perhaps inevitably) depicts this 
as having a certain orientation relative to the rest of the picture. Depiction of shape and orientation 
are, thus, depicted in an HP conforming manner. And when the vehicle part depicts the tail’s color 
(as in Figure 1) we’re invited to note that it (naturally, perhaps inevitably) depicts this color as bound 
to a spatial region with a relatively determinate shape (Dretske, 1981; Quilty-Dunn, 2019b). So, while 
a black and white picture might depict an item’s shape without depicting its color, Pictorialists hold 
that when an icon depicts an item’s color it (more or less inevitably) takes a stand on the color’s spatial 
extension. Indeed, it’s the assumption that this should be true of our psychological icons (like those 
found in pre-attentive vision) which leads Pictorialists to regard evidence that post-attentive object 
representations encode color and shape separately to indicate non-iconic underpinnings (Green & 
Quilty-Dunn, 2017; Quilty-Dunn, 2019b).  
None of this is meant to be arbitrary stipulation. Pictorialists consider HP conformity a natural 
consequence of PP. Thus, PP and HP are seen to naturally cluster together, demarcating a natural kind 
of mental representation (Quilty-Dunn, 2019b, p.4). But critically: this relies on the stronger reading 
of PP. A representation (e.g., a map) might represent parts of that which is represented by the 
representation as a whole using spatially arranged, linguistic labels. Provided that structural (e.g., 
spatial) relations between these labels mirror, and thereby specify structural (e.g., spatial) relations 
between the parts being labeled, the representation would meet the minimal notion of PP conformity 
outlined above. But critically, this would not imply the HP conformity Pictorialists demand. Part-
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representing labels might simply signify things like ‘red here!’ without taking a stand on the shape, 
orientation, or size of the colored region. Thus, what implies the HP conformity Pictorialists 
emphasise is conformity to the stronger reading of PP wherein part-representing-parts of the vehicle 
picture the depicted parts. On this view, color properties are bound to vehicle parts with a (relatively 
determinate) shape-representing-shape. Furthermore, these shape-representing-shapes depict the 
shapes they do by having spatially arranged parts mirror relevant parts of the shape (and their spatial 
arrangement) within a functional/physical space. As such, depicted orientation emerges (naturally, 
perhaps inevitably) out of relations between parts of the relevant shape-representing vehicle parts and 
the rest of the representation, and it is (by hypothesis) hard, if not impossible, to depict these 
properties independently (cf. Block, 1983b). 
2.2 Problems with Pictorialism 
Pictorialism reflects a prominent approach to characterising the iconicity of pre-attentive vision. 
Unfortunately, it is empirically inadequate in this regard. 
Pictorialists posit Pictorialist icons in pre-attentive vision on the grounds that this would explain key 
aspects of pre-attentive vision’s performance profile. To this end, they routinely emphasise pre-
attentive vision’s characteristically high-processing capacity; the fact that pre-attentive vision encodes, 
and efficiently processes, the distinguishing properties/features of many items, in parallel, across large 
portions of the visual field. For Neisser (1967), who coined the term ‘pre-attentive vision’, this was 
illustrated by Sperling’s (1960) pioneering work on iconic memory. However, experimental studies 
investigating stereoscopic vision (Fodor, 2008) and ensemble perception (Quilty-Dunn, 2019b) tell a 
similar story. In each case, Pictorialist icons are invoked to explain item-unlimited computations. Thus, 
Fodor (2008) posits that the iconicity of pre-attentive vision explains how ‘thousands of dots’ (p.191) 
are processed (not simply encoded) efficiently and in parallel during random-dot stereogram experiments, 
while Quilty-Dunn (2019b) posits that the iconicity of pre-attentive vision explains how the visual 
system extracts “statistical regularities in scenes by computing over many more than four objects” 
during ensemble perception (p.8). 
 
          
Figure 2. The ‘oddball’ pops out of the array. 
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For my purposes, ‘disjunctive visual search’ offers a convenient illustration. In disjunctive visual search 
tasks, subjects are tasked with identifying ‘an oddball’ in an array of distractor items (Figure 2). Crudely: 
if the oddball is suitably distinguished by one or more appropriate visual ‘features’ – e.g., colour, size, 
motion, or orientation (Wolfe & Horrowitz, 2017) – performance is (largely) unaffected by set size. 
That is: subjects are as fast and accurate at locating oddballs whether they are located in arrays 
containing 30 items or just 3 (Treisman, 1986, p.117). Since there needn’t be any way for subjects to 
pre-empt the distinguishing feature or location of oddballs, these results indicate that some stage of 
early visual processing succeeds in representing all of the potentially distinguishing features (and 
feature locations) in a large array (containing many features and feature locations) as quickly and 
accurately as it succeeds in representing all (or nearly all) of the potentially distinguishing features (and 
feature locations) in a comparatively small array (containing less features and, hence, feature locations). 
In turn, these findings suggest that the formation of these early visual representations cannot depend 
on the serial deployment of focused attention to the individual features/items encoded, hence why 
they have traditionally been said to reflect ‘pre-attentive’ visual processing (Treisman, 1985). 
Pictorialists appeal to Pictorialist icons to explain such results. To see why, suppose our pre-attentive 
visual representations are not Pictorialist icons and have a descriptive, language-like format instead. 
On this view, pre-attentive visual processing would (seemingly) need to produce and process extra 
symbols when representing large arrays, for extra symbols would be needed to independently encode 
the extra items and potentially distinguishing features contained therein. (To illustrate: contrast the 
number of words in ‘that item is red and triangular’ with those in ‘that object is red and round and 
upright, and that object is…’.) Hence, we might expect pre-attentive visual processes to decrease in 
performance when processing large arrays – a prediction that’s not borne out.  
But suppose the relevant visual representations are Pictorialist icons. Here, it’s unclear why accurately 
depicting extra items, features and properties would involve extra complexity in the representations 
themselves. By conforming to a strong reading of PP, parts of a single symbol could picture spatial 
regions of the seen array, irrespective of whether these regions contain entire items, item parts, or 
empty space. In so doing, structural relations between content-bearing parts of the symbol would 
encode spatial relations between depicted parts of the array, all without increasing demands on 
representational resources. And, through HP conformity, perceptible features/properties (like color, 
shape, and orientation) could be holistically bound to, or emergent out of, depicted regions and their 
spatial relations, marking oddballs out from the crowd. Hence, the intrinsic complexity of the vehicle 
would not correspond to the total number of features/items being represented. So, in the same way 
that a photograph, like Figure 1, might depict all the cats (and cat features) in a large clowder, without 
containing extra pixels or taking longer to develop, Pictorialists claim the iconicity of pre-attentive 
vision explains how and why pre-attentive vision successfully encodes and (through sensitivity to the 
formal properties of its representations) processes large numbers of seen items, item features and item 
locations, in parallel, without incurring a cost to performance (Dretske, 1981; Fodor, 2008; Neisser, 
1967; Quilty-Dunn, 2019a). 
Unfortunately, there’s a problem with this suggestion. While visual search is (often) unaffected by the 
number of distractor items in disjunctive search tasks of the above sort, this isn’t true of other search 
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types. For instance, in ‘conjunctive’ search tasks, oddballs are defined by a conjunction of features. Thus, 
an oddball could differ from other objects in the array by being the only grey and horizontal line, but 
not by being the only grey line nor the only horizontal line (Figure 3). In tasks of this sort, search 
efficiency might be increased in various ways (Humphreys, Hodsoll & Riddoch, 2009; Wolfe, Cave & 
Franzel, 1989), but set size invariably matters. Thus, detecting oddballs in conjunctive search tasks is 
always more time consuming and error prone when oddballs are located in large arrays, ceteris paribus 
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 2018). 
  
Figure 3. A disjunctively defined oddball pops out of the left-hand array; a conjunctively defined oddball 
in the right-hand array does not. 
 
While conjunctive search depends on the allocation of focussed attention, and thus concerns a later 
(‘attentive’) stage of visual processing, it places pressure on the Pictorialist hypothesis. If Pictorialist 
icons are to explain the lack of set-size limitations in disjunctive search tasks, then they must not only 
represent the potentially distinctive properties of items found in observed arrays – they must also pick 
out, or flag, oddballs as oddballs, by virtue of representing their potentially distinctive properties. This 
is crucial because iconicity needs to explain how many items, properties and locations are depicted 
and processed efficiently such that oddballs are detected. But, unless the representation, itself, flags 
the oddball, as such, we’re left with the task of explaining how the Pictorial icon (encoding this 
information) is scanned, such that the oddball is detected in a timely manner.  
Here’s the problem: if oddballs are represented in an HP conforming manner, as Pictorialists insist, 
and pre-attentive visual icons flag oddballs as oddballs by depicting their potentially distinctive 
properties, then oddball detection should be efficient in the aforementioned conjunctive search tasks. 
For if representing (say) an oddball’s color, as such, involves representing it as colored and possessing-
a-given-shape (such that there is no separation in the depiction of these properties), and (furthermore) 
representing the item as possessing either of these properties suffices to flag the item as an oddball in 
disjunctive search tasks (such that it pops-out of the array), then represented conjunctions of properties 
should facilitate pop-out in conjunctive search tasks, where oddballs are marked by this conjunction 
of properties. But, as we have just seen, they do not. Thus: insofar as HP conformity (borne out of a 
strong reading of PP) serves as a necessary condition on a representation’s qualification as an icon (as 
Pictorialist’s insist), and insofar as the characteristically high processing capacity of pre-attentive vision 
serves as a key source of evidence for the postulation of Pictorialist mental icons (as it does: Dretske, 
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1981; Fodor, 2007; Quilty-Dunn, 2019a; 2019b), visual search presents a problem for the Pictorialist 
hypothesis. 
In response, Pictorialists might distance themselves from the assertion that iconicity explains pre-
attentive vision’s characteristically high-processing capacity. This would be a significant concession 
since it is this which standardly motivates the postulation of Pictorialist icons in pre-attentive vision 
(Fodor, 2007, 2008; Quilty-Dunn, 2019a, 2019b). In any case, further findings compound the problem.  
Perhaps most famously: if pre-attentive visual representations of shape size and color are encoded 
independently, in non-HP conforming ways, we might expect pre-attentive vision to occasionally mis-
combine these. Thus, we might expect the (surprising) existence of illusory conjunctions. The existence 
of these is well-documented (Prinzmetal, 2012) but puzzling for the Pictorialist. 
 
 
Figure 4.  
 
In one experiment, subjects were presented with an array containing three coloured letters. Provided 
presentation times were brief (e.g., 200ms), and subjects were prevented from directly attending to the 
shapes, they would regularly report incorrect letter-color combinations. For instance, in an array 
containing a blue ‘T’, a green ‘X’ and a red ‘O’, subjects might report seeing a blue ‘O’, or a red ‘T’, 
and so forth (Treisman & Schmidt, 1982, Exp.1). That subjects were significantly less likely to report 
colors and letters absent from the arrays suggests that subjects’ reports reflected genuine mis-
combinations of perceived features as opposed to misperceptions of the features themselves. And since 
these results were found to obtain in simultaneous matching tasks (Exp.3), it’s generally agreed that 
they don’t simply reflect post-perceptual failures of memory. Rather, mis-combination occurs within 
visual processing itself (Prinzmetal, 2012). Similar findings obtain, when the relevant features are all 
spatially defined and (e.g.) individual edges of a triangle are mis-combined with ‘S’ shapes to produce 
illusory dollar signs (Figure 4; Treisman & Patterson, 1984). 
These results are puzzling unless the representation of relevant feature types enjoys an “independent 
psychological existence” (Treisman, 1986, p.117) that gives rise to a ‘Binding Problem’ (Koch & Crick, 
1991). If pre-attentive vision specifies features (e.g., colors and shapes) accurately, such that these are 
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not misperceived (in themselves), and it processes and represents these in an HP conforming way 
(such that depictions of color cannot float free of depicted shape), it’s hard to see why mistaken 
conjunctions would reliably occur. Meanwhile, positing non-HP conforming representations in pre-
attentive vision makes easy sense of this: if independent features of single items are encoded 
independently (in non-HP-conforming ways) then they can (of course) be incorrectly combined. 
Indeed, this is independently predicted by the hypothesis (Treisman & Schmidt, 1982). 
A Pictorialist might respond that HP conformity is not meant to render an icon’s independent 
encoding of these features impossible, only unlikely. For as Green and Quilty-Dunn (2017) 
acknowledge, to assume otherwise would be to commit ‘the photographic fallacy’ – to (erroneously) 
assume that a pictorial representation must be determinate with respect to every visual feature (Block, 
1983b). Thus, Pictorialists might respond that even if the preceding results do demonstrate the 
existence of distinct icons, specifying the relevant feature types independently of one another, these 
still (somehow) qualify as Pictorialist icons.   
This would be unsatisfactory on two fronts. First, Pictorialists propose that the independent encoding 
of color and shape in (post-attentive) object perception demonstrates that post-attentive object 
representations are not Pictorialist icons (Green & Quilty-Dunn, 2017; Quilty-Dunn, 2019b; see also 
Fodor & Pylyshyn, 2016). Thus, it’s not clear how they can dismiss these concerns. But notice: even 
if they could, HP would still fail to usefully characterise pre-attentive visual representations. Since pre-
attentive visual representations are supposed to exemplify the iconicity Pictorialists describe (Fodor, 
2007, 2008; Quilty-Dunn, 2019a, 2019b), finding that pre-attentive visual representations encode 
relevant features separately would still suffice to show that HP is not a helpful way of characterising 
the kind. Since HP is supposed to be a natural consequence of the PP-conformity Pictorialists posit, 
Pictorialism should then be rejected as a useful characterisation of iconicity in this context, even if it 
can somehow accommodate the above. 
2.3 Analogism 
Pictorialism is empirically inadequate as a (useful) characterisation of pre-attentive visual format. But 
an alternative way of characterising icons – Analogism – can avoid its shortcomings.  
Like Pictorialists, Analogists articulate a sense in which icons are picture-like (hence, they don’t simply 
change the subject). But, unlike Pictorialists, Analogists deny that icons must be picture-like in their 
PP or HP conformity. Instead, they hold that the iconicity of a representation simply depends on the 
representation exploiting an isomorphism between content-bearing properties of the vehicle and the 
properties these depict (Beck, 2019; Burge, 2018; Maley, 2011). As such, iconicity need only involve 
content-bearing properties of the vehicle mirroring the properties they represent, like how a mercury-
in-glass thermometer’s mercury-level mirrors the temperature. 
This mirroring relation could be fleshed out in various ways. It might involve relevant vehicle 
properties varying as a linear function of represented properties (Maley, 2011), a logarithmic function of 
these (Dehaene et al., 2003), or simply as a monotonic function of these (Beck, 2019). But note: while 
the realistic pictures (emphasised by Pictorialists) seem to count as iconic on an unqualified Analogism 
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– such pictures depict properties by having content-bearing properties of the vehicle mirror these 
(hence why moving points of a picture further apart tends to increase the depicted distance between 
these) – many representations which do not qualify as iconic by Pictorialist standards do qualify as 
iconic by Analogists’.  
For instance, Burge (2018) notes (approvingly) that even simple color chits qualify. A color chit 
represents “through its color’s being the same as the color that is represented” (p.81). Thus, there is a 
natural 1-1 mapping between the color of the vehicle and the color depicted, and this mapping 
preserves relations between vehicle values at the level of content. Indeed, it is by doing so that color 
chits represent what they do. As such, color chits qualify as iconic by Burge’s analogist standards since 
content-bearing vehicle properties mirror their contents. But color chits do not have vehicle parts 
which represent parts of the property they depict (Clarke, forthcoming). Nor does their depiction of 
a given color imply their depiction of anything else. Indeed, two distinct chits (e.g., a ‘color chit’ and 
‘orientation chit’) might independently represent distinct properties/features of the same 
item/region/feature, even if these would be holistically bound together in a realistic picture. Thus, 
Analog icons need not conform to PP or HP in the way Pictorialists demand. This allows Analogism 
to avoid the aforementioned problems afflicting Pictorialism in this context.   
2.4 Problems with Analogism 
Alas, Analogism faces problems of its own. Most notably, it’s not clear how Analog icons are meant 
to do the explanatory work that motivates positing pre-attentive visual icons in the first place. This is 
not to suggest that Analogism is false as a characterization of pre-attentive visual representation. It 
simply highlights the fact that if an appeal to ‘iconic representation’ is to do the explanatory work 
which originally (Neisser, 1967) and standardly (Fodor, 2007, 2008; Quilty-Dunn, 2019a, 2019b) 
motivates the postulation of icons in pre-attentive vision, Analogism needs to be qualified in some (as 
yet unspecified) way.  
To illustrate, recall that icons are regularly posited in pre-attentive vision to explain its high-processing 
capacity (§2.2). Here, the explanatory purchase Pictorialist icons offer stems from their PP and HP 
conformity. Crudely: it stems from the idea that pre-attentive visual icons have arbitrarily many 
(spatially arranged) vehicle parts, depicting arbitrarily many (spatially arranged) regions of the visual 
array (with relevant properties holistically bound to these), irrespective of what these regions contain. 
This offers to explain why the number of items/item features fails to dictate the intrinsic complexity 
of the visual representation and thus, fails to dictate the speed/accuracy of the visual processes 
involved in producing/manipulating it. Of course, commitment to a strong reading of PP and HP got 
Pictorialism into trouble as a characterisation of pre-attentive visual representation. But, in abandoning 
these principles, it’s unclear how the Analogist intends to explain these results. For if the Analogist 
allows us to posit distinct ‘chits’ that independently mirror each feature in the display, the total number 
of features being depicted will dictate the complexity of the representation. Thus, short of qualifying 
Analogism in some (as yet unspecified) way, the explanation for pre-attentive vision’s characteristically 
high-processing capacity no longer goes through.  
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Similar points apply to key findings in the mental imagery literature. These are standardly explained 
by appeal to mental icons (Kosslyn et al., 2006). And, given a neuropsychological overlap in the 
mechanisms involved, many consider this reason to deem pre-attentive visual representations similarly 
iconic (Block, 1983a; Carey, 2009, p.458; Quilty-Dunn, 2019b).  
Take Shepard and Metzler’s seminal (1971) work on mental rotation. Here, subjects were presented 
with pairs of line drawings, each depicting a three-dimensional shape. In each pair, depicted shapes 
were either identical, albeit oriented at different angles (like Pair A from Figure 5), or mirror images 
of one another (like Pair C from Figure 5). Subjects pressed a button indicating which of these 
possibilities was true of successively presented pairs and did so as quickly and accurately as possible. 
In so doing it was found that the speed with which subjects correctly identified shapes from a pair as 
identical, albeit rotated at different angles (if and when they were), was proportional to the angular 
difference in the shapes as depicted on the screen. To make sense of this, Shepard and Metzler 
proposed that subjects performed the task by, first, forming a mental image of one or other of the 
shapes and, next, ‘rotating it’ to check for a match (or lack thereof) with its perceived partner. The 
idea was that if the mental image represented the shape like a literal picture (or a 3D model), rather 
than a lingua-form description, and ‘rotation’ of the image proceeded at a steady rate, angular 
differences would wind up proportional to the time taken to bring paired shapes (imagined and 
perceived) into correspondence, to confirm a match.  
 
Figure 5. 
The point to note is that (once again) an unqualified Analogism leaves this obscure. This is not to 
suggest that Analogism is wholly irrelevant to these results. The mirroring relation articulated by the 
Analogist implies that two Analog icons, representing distinct orientations, will have relevant content-
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bearing properties differ by an amount that (in some way) mirrors the difference in orientation 
depicted. Thus, it could explain why bringing two depicted orientations into correspondence requires 
an amount of vehicular manipulation (and, hence, time) that is proportional to the difference in 
orientation being circumnavigated (Maley, 2011). The trouble is: while this helps explain the temporal 
profile of the rotation process that is (by hypothesis) performed in these tasks, it’s irrelevant to the 
identification of a match unless the rotation process brings relevant spatial parts of the shapes into 
correspondence. So, at this point, Pictorialists will maintain that explanations of this sort still require 
that the relevant orientation representations be holistically bound to the depiction of spatial parts, and 
hence that the mental images conform to PP and HP. Indeed, this seems particularly pressing, for if 
the depiction of shape is encoded independently of orientation, it’s unclear why rotation would even 
be helpful (Quilty-Dunn, 2019b, p.8). Representations of shape might just be directly compared, 
independently of (distinct) constituents representing orientation, generating the (false) prediction that 
angular deviation would fail to predict response time.  
These are just two examples. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that if an appeal to ‘iconic representation’ 
is to do the explanatory work which standardly motivates positing icons in pre-attentive vision, an 
unqualified Analogism is inadequate. This is not to say that Analogism is false as a characterisation of 
pre-attentive vision. Many Analogists mean to characterise a broader class of perceptual representation 
than the class of pre-attentive visual representations (e.g., Beck, 2019; Clarke, forthcoming), and they 
are often explicit that the total set of Analog icons subsumes numerous more determinate 
representational kinds (beyond realistic pictures and color chits, Burge [2018, p.89] lists maps, musical 
notations, diagrams, bar graphs, abacuses, and hieroglyphs). Nonetheless, these examples show that if 
an appeal to ‘iconic representation’ is to do the explanatory work that’s routinely expected of it in this 
context, the Analog apparatus must be qualified in some (as yet unspecified) way(s).  
3. A Cartographic Characterisation 
I’ve now considered two ways of characterising ‘iconic representation’ and found that neither makes 
adequate sense of the claim that ‘pre-attentive visual representations are iconic’. Pictorialist 
characterisations look empirically inadequate, while (an unqualified) Analogism fails to provide the 
explanatory purchase motivating the postulation of pre-attentive visual icons in the first place. For 
those wedded to the iconicity of pre-attentive vision, this presents a challenge: specify a relevant 
format type which provides the explanatory purchase needed in this context, without inheriting the 
empirical problems afflicting Pictorialism. 
With this challenge on the table, I’ll now recommend that pre-attentive visual representations possess 
a specific type of cartographic format. This cartographic format builds on an unqualified Analogism 
of the above sort and is related to existing characterisations of pre-attentive vision in the philosophy 
(Matthen, 2005) and psychology (Treisman, 1988) literature. But, since there are various types of 
cartographic structure, I’ll begin by clarifying the cartographic kind I have in mind: The Analog Map. 
What’s distinctive about Analog Maps is that they are analog through and through – they situate analog 
constituents within an analog (spatial) structure. In this way, they differ from other kinds of map, 
which might be thought of as hybrid representations, containing both analog and non-analog 
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(digital/discursive) elements. At the same time, I’ll show that Analog Maps avoid collapsing into, and 
thereby inheriting problems associated with, Pictorialist icons. In making this conjecture, I’ll 
distinguish my proposal from related proposals (§3.1) and highlight reasons to think pre-attentive 
visual representations cartographic in my recommended sense (§3.2).  
3.1 Map-Like Structures 
As Camp notes, maps are marked by a spatial principle of composition (2007, p.158). Constituents are 
located and related in a spatial structure which mirrors, and thereby represents, the spatial relations 
between these. In this respect, maps are iconic by Analog standards and akin to realistic pictures 
(Burge, 2018). However, they differ from realistic pictures in that their spatially related constituents 
need not picture/resemble the entities they represent. This allows a cartographic characterisation of 
pre-attentive vision to avoid the HP conformity which proved problematic for Pictorialism.  
This is not to suggest that maps cannot utilise pictorial constituents. Figure 6a maps a park by picturing 
park structures (e.g., a pond) from a bird’s eye perspective and locating these within a spatial array. In 
so doing, the figure conforms to a strong reading of PP (it represents what it does by having spatially 
arranged parts of the icon picture parts of the region depicted) and HP (in depicting the park’s pond, 
the map takes a stand on its [relative] size, shape, and even color). As such, there are maps, like 6a, 
which qualify as Pictorialist icons. The point is just that some maps are not like this. For example, 
Figure 6b maps the seating arrangement of students in a seminar by arranging representational 
constituents in a spatial array. These constituents specify parts of the class represented by the map as 
a whole, and the map conforms to a minimal reading of PP. But the constituents are not pictures; they 
are linguistic labels, like ‘Mariam’, which bear arbitrary relations to the students they represent. As 
such, spatially arranged constituents represent the students they do without specifying student parts, 
pace the Pictorialist’s strong reading of PP, or properties, pace HP.  
  
Figure 6a.   Figure 6b.  
This is relevant to our concerns in this paper. Pictorialism fails to provide an adequate characterisation 
of pre-attentive vision since it maintains that the pre-attentive visual representation of certain features 
(e.g., an item’s color) should take a stand on others (e.g., its shape, size, and/or orientation). This is 
an empirical conjecture we found grounds to reject, and one which stems from the idea that pre-
attentive visual icons represent things by picturing their parts. But, since maps, like 6b, represent items 
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and item locations without picturing them or their parts (e.g., by using digital constituents to specify 
entities) they can specify individual feature types independently of others. For instance, a map like 6b, 
might use the symbol ‘R’ to flag the location of red regions in space without specifying the shape or 
size of these. Thus, a broadly cartographic conception of pre-attentive vision can avoid the 
commitment to HP which spelled trouble for Pictorialism in this context.  
This observation is not new. When Treisman first proposed that individual feature types enjoy an 
‘independent psychological existence’ in pre-attentive vision, she proposed that individual feature 
types get represented in syntactically distinct ‘feature maps’ (Treisman, 1988). Thus, she proposed that 
pre-attentive vision involves independent, spatially organised representations, charting distinct feature 
types. To clarify this suggestion, philosophers like Matthen (2005) and Clark (2001) have suggested 
that these function as spatially arranged networks of nodes where each node in the network functions 
as a standalone digital symbol, signaling the presence or absence of a designated feature type at its 
indexed location (a bit like Figure 7a). Thus, nodes in the network function like arbitrary symbols 
specifying things like RED HERE! at their indexed location without taking a stand on further features 
of the red item/region. On this view, pre-attentive visual representations are Analog icons in that 
nodes are located in a functional space which mirrors a depicted space, but they situate non-iconic, 
digital symbols within this space. For this reason, let’s call these hybrid representations ‘Digital Maps’. 
   
 
Figure 7a. A Digital Map that uses the digital 
symbol ‘X’ to flag the location of a feature 




Figure 7b: An Analog Map – each US state 
can be thought of as a node which functions 
as a standalone analog icon, varying in 
blueness/saturation as a function of reported 
cases of Lyme disease 
  
For reasons we will discuss, this proposal is on the right track. But critically, it’s not the only way of 
characterising pre-attentive feature maps which would respect the independent encoding of distinct 
feature types. This is because what enables Digital Maps to avoid the HP conformity emphasised by 
Pictorialists is not the fact that constituent parts are digital symbols, which bear arbitrary relations to 
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that which they represent. It’s the fact that spatially arranged constituents are not full-blown pictures, 
which invariably take a stand on multiple feature types at once.  
Sometimes philosophers conflate the non-pictorial with the digital (Fodor, 2007; Sober, 1976). But we 
have already seen that this is a mistake. Simple Analog icons, like color chits, differ in important ways 
from digital representations in that they function to mirror the properties they depict and, thus, do 
not bear entirely arbitrary relations to what they represent. At the same time, they do not amount to 
full-blown pictures – at least not PP or HP conforming pictures. Consequently, on the proposal I wish 
to advance, we should reject the suggestion that pre-attentive visual representations are Digital Maps, 
which use spatially arranged digital constituents to denote the presence and location of individual 
feature types. Instead, pre-attentive visual representations are cartographic networks of nodes, where 
each node in the network functions as a standalone Analog icon, mirroring the properties/features it 
denotes at its indexed location (see: Figure 7b). On this view, pre-attentive visual representations are 
doubly Analog: depicted spatial relations are mirrored by the spatial relatedness of nodes in a 
functional space, and the nodes within this functional space mirror the feature values they depict (i.e., 
function as standalone Analog icons, like independent mercury-in-glass thermometers). Thus, they are 
analog through and through, containing no digital/discursive constituents whatsoever. For this reason, I’ll call 
maps of the sort I am positing ‘Analog Maps’, in contrast with the ‘Digital Maps’ noted above.  
3.2 Pre-attentive Visual Representations are Analog Maps 
To motivate my conjecture that pre-attentive visual representations are Analog Maps, I’m now going 
to argue that this does the explanatory work expected of icons in this context, without inheriting the 
empirical problems afflicting Pictorialism.  
To begin, consider the illusory conjunctions discussed in §2.2. These raised problems for Pictorialist 
characterisations of pre-attentive vision, since they suggested that individual feature types are 
independently encoded in pre-attentive vision. This indicates that pre-attentive visual representations 
do not conform to HP in the way Pictorialists suggest. It is, however, something that a cartographic 
characterisation of pre-attentive vision straightforwardly accommodates (see above). This is because 
distinct feature maps (utilising non-pictorial constituents) can independently depict distinct feature 
types such that each map accurately depicts a given feature type independently of all others (Treisman, 
1988). In turn, this allows that such maps (whether analog or digital) can be mis-combined. So, when 
a subject is presented with a ‘red circle’ and ‘blue triangle’, one feature map might (correctly) register 
the presence of blue and/or red and one feature map might (correctly) register the presence of 
circularity and/or triangularity (or, more likely, the edge orientations corresponding to these shapes), 
yet further resources might mis-combine these, such that they misperceive the circle as blue and the 
triangle as red.  
This charts a logical possibility. However, the empirical details support it. For one thing, illusory 
conjunctions are not random. Rather, the likelihood that two distinct features get mis-combined is 
predicted by their proximity in objective space (Prinzmetal, 2012; cf. Treisman & Schmidt, 1982). This 
suggests that features are indexed to locations within a vehicular space that mirrors this. For if 
‘locations’ in vehicular space mirror objective spatial locations, as a cartographic characterisation 
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implies, then noise in the encoding of features at relevant locations would naturally imply comparable 
levels of noise at the level of the representation’s spatial content. Thus the (noise-ridden) placement 
of features would be expected to average around veridicality, and features would be more likely to get 
(mis)combined with nearby items in objective space. This is something you would not get with, say, 
messy (i.e., noisy) handwriting that merely describes feature locations, suggesting that the relevant pre-
attentive representations really do have a spatial structure, like a map.  
In this way, illusory conjunctions suggest that pre-attentive visual feature representations function like 
spatially structured maps. But, while illusory conjunctions speak against these representations having 
pictorial constituents, which exhibit the HP conformity we found grounds to reject (see §2.2), these 
results are silent on whether pre-attentive feature maps are Analog Maps, as I propose, or Digital Maps, 
as others imply.  
To adjudicate these possibilities, consider the disjunctive visual search tasks discussed in §2.2. Recall 
that disjunctive search for an oddball (suitably defined by a single visual feature) often seems to be free 
of set-size limitations (to an interesting degree). This highlights the characteristically high-processing 
capacity of pre-attentive vision and is the sort of finding that the iconicity of pre-attentive visual 
representation has been expected to explain. A broadly cartographic characterisation of pre-attentive 
vision – which builds in considerably more structure than an unqualified Analogism – can do this. 
Since a feature map, with a cartographic (spatial) structure, can specify features in parallel across the 
whole area being mapped, disjunctively defined oddballs can be efficiently marked out by individual 
feature maps irrespective of total array size. In the same way that parts of a photograph picture items 
at the regions of the scene they depict (irrespective of how many items are located there or elsewhere 
in the scene) nodes in a cartographic network can function to flag the presence of relevant features at 
their indexed locations, in parallel, irrespective of how many features or items are located in the array 
as a whole. This allows that individual feature maps can mark out disjunctively defined oddballs, with 
the distinctive property they encode.  
In this way, the characteristically high-processing capacity of pre-attentive vision can be explained by 
a broadly cartographic characterisation of pre-attentive vision, on which pre-attentive vision involves 
a series of spatially arranged feature maps. But crucially, it is important to note that disjunctive visual 
search is not always fast, efficient and item unlimited. For one thing, oddballs do not pop-out unless 
they differ from distractor objects (with respect to their defining feature) by a suitably large degree 
(Duncan & Humphreys, 1989). And when differences are sufficiently pronounced pop-out is often 
asymmetric. For instance: an item may only pop out if it is, itself, brighter than other (distractor) items 
populating the array, with similar points holding for magnitudes like length and even 
features/properties like orientation, curvature, and closure (Wolfe, 2018).  
A point which has been missed in existing discussions, is that a cartographic characterisation of pre-
attentive vision can elucidate these complications if we suppose that the relevant cartographic 
representations are Analog Maps, with Analog constituents mirroring the properties/features they 
depict/encode at indexed locations, rather than Digital Maps, containing digital/discursive 
constituents. To appreciate this, consider that if content-bearing properties of constituents represent 
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the properties they do by mirroring these, then similarities in content will be mirrored by similarities in 
the content-bearing vehicle properties themselves. So, just as the vehicles representing 99° and 100° 
in two mercury-in-glass thermometers may differ by a barely discriminable amount, explaining why 
their contents get easily confused, the same is true of the Analog constituents involved in Analog 
feature maps (a point which would be compounded by the noise that is inevitably involved in their 
production). Since you wouldn’t expect this if the representational constituents are digital, and bear 
nothing but arbitrary relations to the things they represent (e.g., the digital symbols ‘99°’ and ‘100°’, 
have vehicular properties that seem to differ more than ‘99°’ and ‘90°’ despite the former symbols’ 
relative proximity in content) positing that the constituents in our pre-attentive feature maps are, 
themselves, Analog icons can explain why oddballs do not reliably pop-out unless discriminated (at 
the level of content) by a suitably large margin. This is one reason to favor the suggestion that pre-
attentive visual feature maps are Analog Maps, over the suggestion that they are Digital. 
Better still, the postulation of Analog Maps can elucidate the aforementioned search asymmetries. If 
the constituents of a feature map depict properties like brightness at their indexed location by having 
their content bearing properties mirror these, then nodes depicting the brightest points in the array 
can function as if they are shouting louder than other nodes. Or, put in computational terms, it allows 
that a consumer system involved in oddball detection could simply be sensitive to this content bearing 
property of the representation, allocating resources to regions of the feature map 
oscillating/spiking/firing most/least intensely. This would be analogous to the same way one might 
find the longest (but not the shortest) piece of spaghetti in a pack by tapping the butt of the pack on 
the table and seeing which piece pops out furthest. Once again, this is an aspect of visual search that 
is left unexplained by the suggestion that pre-attentive feature maps have digital constituents. So, again, 
it is reason to favor the conjecture that pre-attentive feature maps are Analog Maps. 
Finally, the postulation of Analog Maps can explain why conjunctive search tasks are often slow and 
inefficient. In this respect, the hypothesis inherits the virtues of a cartographic characterisation more 
generally. For while individual feature maps suffice to mark out suitably defined disjunctive oddballs, 
additional resources are required to appropriately bind and consider content from distinct maps in 
tandem (Treisman, 1988). So, in sum: positing Analog Maps in pre-attentive vision inherits the virtues 
of a broadly cartographic characterisation of pre-attentive vision while avoiding the empirical 
problems afflicting Pictorialism in this context. Better still, it explains aspects of visual search which 
are left obscure by an unqualified Analogism or by the postulation of Digital Maps. 
What about mental imagery? In §2.4, we saw that those positing pre-attentive visual icons often assume 
that visual imagery has an iconic format, where a neurofunctional overlap in the mechanisms involved 
evinces the iconicity of pre-attentive vision. Such reasoning is indirect. But a similar line of thought 
might motivate an inference in the opposite direction: for if pre-attentive visual representations are 
Analog Maps, an alleged overlap in the mechanisms of vision and visual imagery might imply that 
visual imagery be underpinned by representations of a comparable sort. This raises the question: could 
the Analog Maps I’m positing explain performance in (say) mental rotation tasks? 
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This question is pressing given the shortcomings of an unqualified Analogism in this context. 
However, the answer seems to be ‘yes’. Indeed, there are respects in which Analog Maps offer a 
superior explanation of the relevant phenomena.  
 
               Figure 8a         Figure 8b. 
To illustrate, note that the representations I am positing have a fundamentally spatial structure, 
indexing features to spatial locations. As such rotating feature maps (as a whole) can still bring indexed 
features into correspondence. For instance, placing Figure 8a over Figure 8b and rotating Figure 8a 
90° clockwise will bring indexed features of the former into correspondence with the latter.  
Admittedly, this (alone) does not suffice to establish a match in the spatial structure of depicted shapes. 
This is because the correspondence of indexed spatial features among rotated feature maps is 
consistent with these spatial features differing in marked ways (for instance, their correspondence does 
not establish that the represented features [e.g., edges] are now oriented in the same ways). 
Nevertheless, positing that the constituents at these indexed locations depict the spatial features they 
do (e.g., oriented edges) by mirroring these (e.g., having some property of the vehicular constituent vary 
as a function of the orientation being depicted) implies that when an overlap in the constituents occurs, 
differences in the values of relevant constituents will be consistent at the level of both content and 
vehicle. This allows that a match in shape be confirmed (or rejected) via a simple computation, which 
tracks a consistent difference in the content-bearing properties of overlapping constituents. And since 
feature maps only specify the features of shapes depicted (e.g., edges as opposed to shapes as a whole), 
the account explains why mental rotation would still be needed to confirm a match. 
An attractive aspect of this proposal is that it can explain why subjects seem able to abstract away 
from certain feature types in mental rotation tasks. For example, Khooshabeh and Hegarty (2008) 
found that subjects with relatively poor spatial acuity perform better in mental rotation tasks when 
matching pairs of shapes are consistently colored. By contrast, subjects who perform well in mental 
rotation tasks enjoyed no such benefit. Indeed, inconsistent coloring failed to interfere with their 
performance altogether, suggesting that they were able to disregard color entirely.  
Both results can be explained by my characterisation of the underlying representations. Those with 
poor spatial acuity could have identified matching shapes by simply rotating spatially arranged color 
maps and observing whether this brought relevant color constituents into correspondence. 
Meanwhile, those with better spatial acuity may have completed the task by rotating relevant spatial 
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feature maps (as above). But since spatial maps are independent of color maps, subjects were able to 
disregard color maps entirely, avoiding Stroop-like interference from these (something which would 
seem surprising on a thoroughgoing Pictorialism). 
4. Ramifications 
This paper has examined the suggestion that pre-attentive visual representations have an iconic 
(picture-like) format. §2 considered two prominent ways of understanding this suggestion and argued 
that neither is entirely adequate: Pictorialism was suggested to be empirically inadequate, while (an 
unqualified) Analogism failed to do the explanatory work needed to motivate the postulation of iconic 
representations in the first place. This challenged us to provide a characterisation of pre-attentive 
visual format that avoids these shortcomings; a challenge which I have argued is met on the conjecture 
that pre-attentive vision involves a series of functionally independent Analog Maps. On this view, pre-
attentive visual representations are doubly Analog: they situate (non-Pictorial) Analog constituents 
within a functional space which (itself) mirrors objective space, and hence possess no 
digital/discursive elements. In so doing, the proposal stands in contrast to the postulation of 
Pictorialist icons in this context, builds on an unqualified Analogism, and improves upon existing 
cartographic characterisations in the vicinity.  
To close, I wish to stress that, if correct, my proposal has ramifications for debates which typically 
assume the iconicity of pre-attentive vision. To illustrate, consider recent debates over the existence 
and mark of a perception-cognition border. Here, a venerable tradition (henceforth The Common Format 
Hypothesis) holds that the perceptual is somehow marked or demarcated by the format of its 
representations (Block, 2014). This hypothesis is notoriously controversial (Fodor, 2015; Quilty-
Dunn, 2019b). But both sides in the debate have proceeded on the assumption that since pre-attentive 
visual representations are iconic, the viability of a format-based perception-cognition border requires 
that all perceptual representations take this form (cf. Clarke, forthcoming). As such, it is striking that 
opponents of a Common Format Hypothesis have typically assumed a thoroughgoing Pictorialism 
about pre-attentive vision’s iconicity. This has led them to propose that if certain perceptual 
representations are not Pictorialist icons, then a Common Format Hypothesis is unsustainable.  
To this end, Quilty-Dunn deems perceptual object representations ‘the most striking’ counterexample 
to the Common Format Hypothesis (2019b, p.9). He finds several problems with the idea that these 
might be Pictorialist icons. However, an initial worry stems from the suggestion that perceptual object 
representations track objects in abstraction from their low-level properties – e.g., their color, shape 
and size (see: van Marle & Scholl, 2003) – something which is “inconsistent with [the HP conformity 
of these representations]” (Green & Quilty-Dunn, 2017, p.8) and, more dramatically, the Common 
Format Hypothesis itself (Quilty-Dunn, 2016; 2019b). 
The problem with this line of attack should now be clear: this alleged lack of HP conformity only 
speaks against the iconicity of perceptual object representations if one assumes a Pictorialist notion of 
iconicity. If one, instead, takes a cartographic characterisation as their starting point, as is motivated 
by the preceding discussion, proponents of a Common Format Hypothesis have no reason to expect, 
let alone demand, HP conformity in these representations. This is especially notable, since there seems 
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to be little obscurity to the idea that perceptual systems might track and represent objects in a map-
like format. After all, perceptual object tracking appears to involve an indexing of depicted objects to 
spatial locations (Pylyshyn, 2007) and this is readily explained in cartographic terms since maps have a 
principle of spatial isomorphism (Camp, 2007; Treisman, 1988).  
Admittedly, if perceptual object representations really do abstract away from the depiction of all object 
features (bar spatial location) then differences between pre-attentive visual representations and post-
attentive object representations seem likely to persist. For one thing, it is likely that the constituents 
of our spatially arranged object maps will not be Analog icons (as I have suggested is true of pre-
attentive visual feature maps). Rather, constituents will need to function in a digital/discursive manner, 
signalling a sharp (non-graded) distinction between the presence and absence of given objects at their 
indexed locations. Even still, the relevant perceptual kind may remain unified by its broadly 
cartographic structure – or, perhaps, by a broader Analog characterisation of iconicity on which 
cartographic representations constitute but an important sub-type (Burge, 2018; Clarke, forthcoming). 
Indeed, with these points in view, it’s natural to suppose that the deepest challenge to a Common 
Format Hypothesis may stem from the existence of post-perceptual, cognitive representations with a 
cartographic or Analog structuring (e.g., cognitive maps used in spatial navigation, the depictive 
representations used in mental imagery/imagistic thought and, perhaps, the analog magnitude 
representations employed in primitive numerical computations). In any case, a Cartographic 
Conception of pre-attentive vision seems to command a fundamental reformulation of these debates: 
soothing problems which have traditionally presented problems for the Common Format Hypothesis, 
while highlighting neglected challenges in need of further examination.  
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